The Price of Dissent: The Iowa Farmers Union and the Early Cold War, 1945 War, -1954 BRUCE FIELD SINCE THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Americans have applauded the supposed U.S. victory in the Cold War. The public has neglected the Cold War's daniaging impact on U.S. society, however. For example, citizens pay scant attention to the injustices of McCarthyism, a movement that historian Stanley Kutler dramatically describes as the "American Inquisition."^ Yet it is important to remember nation-shaping events such as the purge of the China experts, the trial of Alger Hiss, and the exaggerations of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. While it did not receive the exposure of these better-known events, the fate that befell the Iowa Farmers Union and its president, Fred Stover, between 1945 and 1954 illustrates the Cold War's effects on Iowa's history. The Iowa Farmers Union was one of fifteen affiliates of the National Farmers Uruon (NFU), the nation's third-largest general farm organization.^ After World War II, the five hundred 1. Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War (New York, 1982) . 2. After World War II, the American Farm Bureau Federation claimed the largest national membership (1.5 million members), while the National Grange served the interests of 800,000 farmers nationwide. The history of the Grange and the Farm Bureau can be found in a variety of sources. See Lowell Dyson, Farmers' Organizations (New York, 1986) ; Wesley McCune, Who's Behind Our Farm Policy (New York, 1956) ; and Walter W. Wilcox, Sodal Responsibility in THE ANNALS OF IOWA 55 (Winter 1996) . ©The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1996. thousand members of the NEU distinguished themselves from other organized farmers by publicly criticizing President Truman's foreign policy. Unlike members of the National Grange and the American Earm Bureau Eederation, those in the National Earmers Union rejected a single-minded focus on overseas markets; likewise, they rejected the notion that Commimism was the major roadblock to American success. Led by national president James G. Patton, the organization instead hoped that the United States would take a "cooperative role in shaping the future of the entire world." Speaking to the armual convention of the South Dakota Earmers Union in the fall of 1945, Patton argued that Americans needed to "learn to live in a peace based on patience, tolerance, and understanding of the peoples who do not speak our language, who do not use our form of govemment, and whose concepts are predicated upon centuries of economic, social, and political backgrounds widely different from ours. Specifically," he continued, "we must learn to live in this world with the great country of Russia. We simply must come to understand how Russian people think, why they do what they do, and then guide our foreign policy in terms of a firm position but with determination to cooperate to live in peace."F The NFU, disappointed with U.S. policymakers' aggressive stance, denoxmced the major tenets of the Truman admirüstra-tion's policy of containment. It rejected continued development of atomic weapons in favor of "complete disarmament, right down to pistols." It judged Truman's $18 billion military budget to be part of an unnecessary plan to "whale the tar out of somebody pretty soon." In keeping with his view of the TrumariDoc-i/ trine as an example of "saber-rattling, oppressive irnperiaïîsîrî;_ Tim Patton warned against the Marshall Plan. He noted that the \ "Ümfeä^tates could not "afford to take the position that we are a big bad Santa Claus who is footing the bills and therefore is going to be boss."* The National Farmers Union's argument was as simple as it was direct. The United States, it argued, had failed to live up to its pronouncements of international cooperation. Instead, the Urüted States had bypassed the newly created United Nations to shape the world as it saw fit. The Truman admirüstration's approach rejected the cooperative spirit exhibited by the Allies during World War 11. Preoccupied with strategic and defense concerns, it betrayed traditional American respect for national self-determination by supporting undemocratic regimes. It also contrived one crisis after another to justify American action in the place of what it claimed to be an inadequately prepared United Nations. The United States risked losing credibility with or alienating many of the world's peoples if they followed the Truman administration's scheme, according to the NFU. Further, its aggressive stance interfered with the re-establishment of economic ties between western and eastern Europe. Finally, it squandered American dollars on containment of a supposed Commimist threat. This money might be better spent, the NFU insisted, on domestic development, such as programs to assist the nation's embattled family farmers. B etween 1945 and 1949 , the National Farmers Union opposed U.S. foreign policy persistently and intensely. Maintaining its principled opposition to the Truman administration grew more difficult, however, in the summer of 1950. On June 25, 1950, North Korean ti:oops crossed the 38th Parallel. The United States and United Nations interpreted the action as Communist aggression and sent troops to assist South Korea. Shortly after the deployment of U.S. troops, Jim Patton assured President Truman that the NFU supported his efforts in Korea. After conferring with his executive committee, Patton issued an eightparagraph position statement on "the Present Crisis in Asia." He reminded members that the organization had "openly criticized" U.S. foreign policy in the past, but concluded that the "evil" actions of the Soviet Union in "fomenting armed aggression" in Korea had made United States and United Nations action necessary. Patton's appeal to his executive committee made it clear why he favored such a policy reversal. "I believe," he wrote, "that the primary function of the Farmers Union and its officials is to preserve that Union. And I am sure that if our Union is to be preserved and looked upon and heard as a responsible organization in the Urüted States, it is absolutely necessary for us to support the Urüted Nations and to support our Govemment which is now at war."* 5. The National Farmers Union also disagreed with the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau Federation over other issues besides foreign policy, most notably in its advocacy of an active governmental role in the economic life of the nation. As the self-professed spokesgroup for the nation's "family farmers," the NFU advocated direct govenunent support programs and questioned the other two groups' emphasis on pure free enterprise capitalism. 6. Undated interoffice commimication of the National Farmers Uruon, summarizing the 18 July 1950 meeting between Jim Patton and President Truman, box 10, James G. Patton Papers, Westem Historical Collections, University of Colorado Library; Policy Statement of James G. Patton, President, National Farmers Union, 8 September 1950, series no. 5, box 4, National Farmers Union In the months that followed, Patton reiterated his new-found support for U.S. foreign policy. Although he had vigorously protested an annual defense budget of $18 billion in 1946, by late 1950 he had changed his mind. "My own personal opinion," he wrote in a letter to Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, "is that we should spend $50 billion a year for the next three years on the defense effort just on the basis that we are going to present a stronger armed position. If we must get ready for a major war with Russia, then I think we should do our planning on the basis of spending half of our national income for that effort."Î n October 1950 Patton told the South Dakota Farmers Union that U.S. policymakers needed to realize "that aggression anywhere in this closely knit world is an eventual threat to our security at home." By January 1951, Patton seemingly exceeded the zeal of Truman administration policymakers, suggesting that m^odified containment was inadequate and arguing for more forceful steps.* Several factors contributed to Patton's clear reversal of policy, including the volatile state of postwar liberalism reflected in Henry Wallace's disappointing presidential campaign in 1948.' More than an5^thing, however, Patton desired to "preserve the [National Farmers] Union... as a responsible organization in the United States." To accomplish that goal, Patton had to counter damaging charges of sjonpathy with, and even direct control by. Communist agents.^" Although the supporting evidence consisted mostly of fabrication, Americans generally believed that the National Farmers Uruon was at least sjmipathetic to Soviet aims, if not directly controlled by Moscow.
Some of the most vocal crifics of the NFU were members of the National Farmers Union themselves." In 1946, for example, Nebraska Farmers Uruon president Chris Milius accused the national organization of being "Commimistic." Gardner Jackson, who had served the Nafional Fanners Urüon in a variety of tmofficial capacifies since 1936, also accused the organizafion and its leadership of being "bewitched by the siren song of salvafion for humanity simg by the Commvinists." In 1947, National Union Farmer editor James Elmore resigned over the issue, accusing Patton and the Union's "confused left-wing leadership" of "playing foofie" with the Commurüsts and of following a "pro-communist coUaborafiorüst li"*1 11. The National Farmers Urüon had a lengthy history of intemal squabbling that dated to the founding of the orgarüzation in Texas in 1902. Early bickering over the predominance of Texans in leadership roles was followed in subsequent years by interne disputes over whether to expand political activity, whether to allow nonfarmers to become members, and whether to support the policies of the New Deal. The occasional intercity of these intemal debates led Jim Patton to characterize one four-year period in the organization's history as an "Irish Picnic" in which "everybody grabbed a shillala and hit the first person he could see." Quoted in Charles H. Livermore, "James G. Patton responded to these charges by accusing Milius of having a "narrow creviced mind" and by describing Jackson's charges as "so preposterous as to warrant disregard."" His anger stemmed both from the disloyalty of National Earmers Urüon colleagues and from the unsubstantiated nature of their charges. Patton found himself in a frustrating situation as the charges of Communist sympathizing grew: how could the Earmers Union, amidst the anti-Communist hysteria of the time, simultaneously remain an organization of dissent and a key player in the world of Washington politics?
In the 1930s and early 1940s, the National Earmers Union had criticized an unholy alliance between business and govemment, one that it believed contributed to the demise of the nation's family farmers. Although critical of government-business cooperation, the NEU had maintained a degree of respect and influence in Washington; Patton and other National Earmers Union officials frequently testified before congressional committees and served in a number of advisory positions." Criticism of the nation's economic system was one thing, but criticism of its foreign policy, particularly as Americans began dying in Korea, was quite another. As charges of subversion mounted in 1950 In 1950 these activities also made him the subject of FBI anä"' State Department investigations. Finally, his imwillingness to bridle his criticism of U.S. foreign policy made him a likely target for an NFU purge sponsored by Jim Patton.^* Jim Patton had acted on his uneasiness about the future of the National Farmers Union even prior to the Korean War. In late 1949 and early 1950 he had orchestrated the removal of Denver headquarters worker Lee Fiyer, organization legal coun- 15. Icma Union Farmer, 19 April 1947 , 20 November 1948 ,19 March 1947 ,16 April 1949 National Union Farmer, January 1949 . 16. FBI reports, 24 January 1956 and 18 August 1956 sel Cliff Purr, and Minnesota state president_Einer Kuivinen. \/ v/ Stover believed that his highly publicized rejection of Truman's policies placed Iowa "next on the purge list." However, Stover remained naively optimistic that NFU members would prevent the organization from openly supporting the Truman administration.^In a letter to Northeastern Division president Archie "7 Wrightj^Stover concluded that Patton would probably try to curry political favors and "water down our foreign policy position by ambiguous language and doubletalk," but he "wouldn't dare" call for a total reversal of "our good position on foreign !' Stover's optimisnt ended when the Korean War began. Although he was xmable to attend the meeting, he sent an address that included a clear ultimatum. "The power to revoke ... state charters," Fatton wrote, "is held by the National Farmers Union, to be exercised ... in the case of intolerable departures from the democratically-adopted policies of a majority in convention." Fatton also released a statement to the Des Moines Register, a newspaper that had opposed Stover for years and that had characterized the Iowa Farmers Union as "a tiny fringe of little consequence." In his statement to the newspaper, Patton announced that he was "totally in disagreement with Fred Stover's present position on international policy" and that he felt "certain that the members of the Iowa Farmers Union, too, almost to a man, disagree with him."^°F atton's message was clear. Stover was the problem, and the Iowa Farmers Union could retain its charter if the members removed Stover as president. Otherwise, it faced loss of affiliation with the national organization. Fatton, however, was wrong about Iowa Farmers Union members. Not only was Stover reelected president, but the Iow^a Farmers Union also called for "a settlement of the present war in Korea" that accorded with Stover's views.^Ĥ aving failed to unseat Stover by appealing to the state membership, Fatton adopted a new strategy. With the help of a small dissident group of Iowa Farmers Union mem^bers, Fatton tried to prove that Stover should be removed as president of the Iowa Farmers Union. He claimed that Stover had violated the national orgarüzation's constitutional mandate against non- partisan activity when he served as cochairman of the Progressive Party. Patton directed the question to Washington, D.C. attorney Carl Berueffy, who returned the legeil opinion that Stover should have resigned as Iowa Farmers Union president before accepting the position in the Progressive Party. According to Berueffy, Stover was no longer legally state president and should relinquish his office to vice-president Leonard Hoffman, the leader of anti-Stover forces in Iowa.T he argument was clearly a contrived effort to eliminate Stover. The timing of Berueffy's response (less than one week after the Iowa convention ended) strongly suggests that Hoffman or Patton, or both, had concocted Ö\e scheme in advance. Patton's decision to consult Berueffy, someone unaffiliated with the Union, could be considered an extraordinary attempt at! impartiality. In consulting one outside authority, however, Patton also avoided the lengthy battle that might have ensued had he either consulted a number of impartial outsiders or referred the question to the NFU's executive committee, board of directors, or entire membership. By relying on the advice of one attorney, Patton got what he wanted-a quick solution to a sticky problem. He also managed to avoid any discussion of inconvenient facts. Stover had, by this time, resigned his position in the Progressive Party. Moreover, Patton had also served as vice-chairman of the National Citizen's Political Action Committee. In 1944, he had successfully defended his right to hold the national presidency when critics charged that he had violated the NFU's rules against partisan activity. Although Patton had opposed this ploy when used against him, he fully supported it when used against Stover. Patton's attempt failed, however. In April, 1951 the Iowa courts declared that Fred Stover was the legitimate president of the Iowa Fanners Union. TWICE DEEEATED in his attempts to remove Stover, Jim Patton wrote Wisconsin Earmers Union president Ken Hones that the national board of directors would "have to take specific action in relation to Iowa." He could not isolate Stover from the Iowa Earmers Union, but he could try to isolate the Iowa Earmers Union from the rest of the NEU by revoking its charter. Of course, Patton and the national leadership had no intention of permanently banning Iowa farmers from membership. After cancelling the charter of the Stover-led Iowa Earmers Union, they planned to revive the state group under more cooperative leadership.^* Some Iowartô favored this approach. Dwight Anderson, who had unsuccessfully challenged Stover for the Iowa Earmers Union presidency in 1948, asked the national organization to "revoke or suspend the charter of the Iowa Earmers Union as soon as possible, and then come in and set up a new organization."^ North Dakota president Glenn Talbott, Patton's closest ally in the attempt to unseat Stover, candidly admitted that neither the NEU nor its supporters in Iowa had any "sound, legal grounds for revocation or cancellation of the Iowa Earmers Urüon Charter."^* Still, Patton forces used the organization's historic fiftieth anrüversary convention in 1952 as the springboard for the strategy.
Patton and Talbott arrived at the Dallas convention determined to eliminate the aruioying elements that the national president now derisively described as the NEU's "tadpoles."^Ŵ orking closely with other national figures, Patton designed a constitutional amendment that would increase affiliates' minimum membership requirement from 1,000 to 3,500. Organi- zations failing to meet the minimum membership by the end of 1953 faced charter revocation.^^ The amendment jeopardized five affiliates: Oregon (which had a paid membership of 3,407), Michigan (2,919), Texas (2,634), Iowa (2,296), and the Eastern Division (3,213).^' As was evident from both preconvention planning and subsequent actions, however, the change was aimed exclusively at Iowa and the Eastern Division, the two regional affiliates that continued to criticize U.S. foreign policy.
In the weeks leading up to the convention, Patton loyalists laboriously drafted and redrafted the rationale for the constitutional change. At one point, the writers toyed with directly censuring Fred Stover. In the end, however, they decided upon an executive committee "Statement and Recommendation" that refrained from citing specific individuals yet clearly was directed at the two organizational affiliates who most vocally opposed the NFU's recent endorsement of President Truman's foreign policy.^"
The statement "upheld the right of the individual to his views and of a minority to be heard and to have its views considered." But, it continued, "Liberty is not license and the improper and dangerous actions and methods of a relatively small minority within the organization may no longer be ignored." Specifically, the statement claimed that a "small group" of NFU members had parficipated in a series of "wrongful and dangerous acts." These wrongdoers had, like dictators, attempted "to control, divide, confuse, [and] conquer." They had distributed publications "financed by unknown sources" that were "deliberately misleading." When NFU officials attempted to contact members and ex-members who disagreed with these unnamed men, they had held "their own state boundaries to be inviolable." Finally, they had used educational funds "in violation of the rights of... other states and of National Farmers Union."'^ In concise form, the executive committee's statement reviewed the charges that had been levelled against the Iowa Farmers Union since the start of the Korean War. It is imdear, however, whether the executive committee's statement was ever presented to the convention or whether it merely existed as a justification should the need have arisen.
The organizational structure of the Dallas convention precluded the possibility of meaningful discussion of the issues. Convention delegates' votes were weighted, each vote given more or less weight depending on the membership strength of the affiliate they represented. It was possible, therefore, for Glerm Talbott's North Dakota delegation, which represented over one-fourth of the national membership, to dominate decisions with the support of just a few other affiliates. The Talbott-Patton forces knew that they could attain their objective even without debate and so sat mute as the proposed constitutional amendment was introduced.
Simeon Martin, from the threatened Michigan affiliate, was the Hrst of many speakers who opposed the change. He reminded delegates how difficult it was to organize in regions that were "sewed up tight with the reactionary Farm Bureau." Fred Stover reiterated Martin's observation, adding that the constitutional change represented an alarming denunciation of "the very things we stand for." Eastern Division executive secretary Louis Slocum followed, claiming that it was foolish to adopt a proposal that made the orgarüzation neither bigger nor more powerful. After further comments from Stover, a Washington state delegate argued that he would be imable to face the membership in his state if the amendment passed. Oklahoma's Roscoe Beale, who felt that the change placed unnecessary hardships on smaller states, pleaded for rejection of the amendment.
Prior to the vote, not one delegate spoke in support of the proposed change. Yet when it came time to vote, the measure 31. " Statement and Recommendation," February 1952, box 9, folder 44, Talbott Family Papers. passed overwhelmingly. The threatened affiliates in Oregon, Michigan, Iowa, and the Eastern Division opposed the amendment, as did Minnesota and some dissenting individuals in Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. Their combined vote, however, was overpowered by individual votes from Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, and block votes from Arkansas, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, the Rocky Mountain Division, and, surprisingly, the threatened state of Texas. After the balloting, a South Dakota delegate who favored the action naively claimed that no affiliate would actually face charter revocation. Iowa's Merle Hansen, a close friend of Fred Stover, offered a more realistic assessment when he described the convention action as being driven by "the substance of hysteria." Hansen predicted that the delegates had just authored "the articles of suicide" for the National Farmers ^T HE SILENCE of the Fatton-Talbott contingent gave the Dallas convention a conspiratorial air. Their substantial planning had paid off, but they might have been overprepared.^^ They held enough votes to quash dissent and manned the key positions in the parliamentary regulation of the proceedings. Fatton's supporters merely had to show up, cast their votes, and quietly listen to, or perhaps ignore, their opponents' futile objections. Constitutional amendments that tightened the controlling grip of the national leadership were passed in the same fashion as the membership requirement amendment-without one word of support. Elections were managed in a similar fashion. For example, national vice-presidential candidate Marie Holte gave a ten-minute election speech while her opponent, incumbent Herb Rolph, declined to speak. Holte, who had introduced a peace resolution at the November 1951 North Dakota 32. Transcript of convention debate, pp. 164-91, series no. 5, box 4, book 2 (Master Proceedings File), NFU Papers. 33. In addition to the extensive preconvention work on the executive committee's "Statement and Reconunendation," the national leadership arrived in Dallas with a "file of letters" from Iowa's pro-Hoffman forces that they suspected would be "extremely helpful" in obtaining converts. Glenn J. Talbott to James G. Patton, 26 February 1952, box 10, folder 3, Talbott Family Papers. Fanners Union convention, was resoundingly defeated. Peace resolutions also got the silent treatment. When Simeon Martin called for the renunciation of colonialism and the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces "from foreign soil," committee members listened "in silence," gave his resolution scant consideration, and then declined to present it to the convention for discussion.^* Despite the Dallas Morning News's banner headline announcing "Farmers Union Defeats Issue on Cease-Fire," there was no "bitter floor fight" over the Korean War. Actually, the carefully orchestrated convention muzzled Fred Stover's supporters and their efforts to debate foreign policy. A Rank and File Committee circulated a "Statement of Principles" that objected to "some Farmers Union leaders' endorsement of the gigantic . . . war mobilization program. ..." Those leaders, the committee argued, had "capitulated to the fantastic and fatal delusion that farm prosperity can be attained through a gigantic warspending program" and had accepted "the fiction that the present foreign policy is the road to peace and prosperity." Dismissing Soviet imperialism from the program committee's list of "major threats to true world brotherhood and peace," the Rank and File Committee asked the convention to recognize only one significant danger: "the existence in the world of uncorrected and indefensible evils that provided the seed bed for agitafion, uprising, and revolt." In calling for U.S. withdrawal from Korea, the committee noted that events in that nation had been produced by "starvation, exploitation, feudalism, [and] dictatorships," not the determination of the Soviet Union "to exploit every wrong for her own imperialistic purposes," as the NFU's proposed policy statement suggested. Finally, the committee called for an American agenda that rejected the "threat of polifical and economic penetration" as an instrument of foreign policy. These strongly worded denunciations of U.S. policy, which at previous NFU convenfions had echoed through every address, now were heard only in hallways and hotel rooms. Besides Marie Holte's references to "farm boys ... in some far off place shooting people and being shot for something they know not what," the only speech that even remotely suggested criticism of American policy was made by Scotland's Lord Boyd Orr, the former head of the U.N.'s Eood and Agriculture Organization.^F acts for Farmers reported a more accurate version of events when it declared that the top officers of the National Earmers Urüon had struck "a heavy pro-Truman note" at Dallas.^* Jim Patton, reversing his earlier criticisms of American vmilateralism, argued that events in Korea had left the United States "no choice but to maintain a protective shield of military strength to protect free nations against possible military aggression by would-be totalitarian world rulers." Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan, invited by Patton to address the convention, spoke in similar terms. The Urüted States, Brannan said, was "willing to spend billions on defense-because we clearly must." Brannan concluded, "[W]e cannot afford to allow a billion people to fall under the domination of the Kremlin if aid from us will prevent it." All that was needed to make the proTruman celebration complete was President Truman himself, but Truman declined Patton's invitation. When he sent his regrets, however, Truman praised the National Earmers Union and expressed his belief that the organization would "continue to support a strong, forward-looking foreign policy. "^3 In 1952, nobody could predict how long the National Farmers Urúon would pursue its new-found support for Truman's policies. What was obvious, however, was that the organization had altered its political orientation. The NFU had done more than accept a more aggressive Americein role in world affairs. At Dallas, it had also compromised a number of other views that had defined the orgariization. It now encouraged private enterprise and opposed "governmental agricultural collectives." It cautiously avoided condemning Farm Bureau proposals to move poorer farmers off the land; it also avoided recommending an accelerated price support program for agriculture. As the Rank and File Committee observed, these positions were a complete violation of the tradifions of the NFU. "Never before," the committee charged, "has the National Farmers Uruon identified itself with exploiting business interests, placed limitations on the cooperative movement, [or] advocated a program of scarcity."^* Not only had it relinquished its role as foreign policy critic, but it also had abandoned the premise that American unilateralism damaged the domestic welfare of the nation's farmers. Discarding their old articles of faith, the leaders of the NFU adopted new policy positions that supported American strength abroad, minimized direct government assistance to farmers, and, reflecting the insecure temper of the times, allowed no room for organizational dissent.
After the convention, Jim Patton remarked that opponents of the organization's new direction had put on a "very shady and shabby performance."^' The truth was, however, that the national president and his backers were the ones guilty of underhanded tactics, particularly in the orchestration of constitutional restructuring to purge Fred Stover and other "heretics" from the NFU. As the new 3,500-person minimum membership requirement took effect in 1953, it became obvious that the restructuring had been instituted for no other reason than to remove Cold War critics from the organization. THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION'S internal divisions hurt membership drives in each of the five states potentially targeted by the new charter revocation clause. Perhaps because the quarrel had taken place in its own backyard, the Texas affiliate was the most severely damaged. By 1953, its membership had dropped 59 percent, from 2,634 to 1,069. Iowa's membership (•-x dropped by 43 percent, from 2,296 to 1,311. A part of this de-V-^ĉ line in Iowa may have been due to the controversial position Vô f the Iowa Farmers Union, but Iowa membership also fell because anti-Stover forces urged members to boycott the affiliate. Michigan lost 32 percent of its membership, the Eastem Division lost 28 percent, and Oregon lost 20 percent of its members.*" Despite the decline in er\rollment, each of the five affiliates still met the one-thousand-member minimum originally prescribed by the National Farmers Union constitution. The Dallas revision, however, had made each a potential victim.
When the national board of directors met in Denver on March 13,1954, it considered an executive committee report that detailed the membership situations of the five affiliates aiid recommended appropriate action. This was a remarkable document, not only because of its obvious bias against Iowa and the Eastem Division, but also because of the rationalizations it contained. These justifications reveal much about the true motivations of the National Farmers Union.
Texas, the state that had lost the greatest percentage of members between 1952 and 1953, now had the lowest membership total of any of the orgarüzation's fifteen affiliates. The executive committee reminded the board of directors, however, that Texas was "the original home of the Farmers Union" and its affiliate was directed by officers who were "capable, conscientious and hard working." In addition, the Texas affiliate's insurance program was "soundly developing and expanding." For these rea- sons, the executive committee recommended leaving Texas's charter status "imdisturbed."*'
The executive committee also recommended sustaining Oregon's charter, in part because of its thriving insurance program. While the official state membership was 2,711, Oregon could claim more than three thousand National Farmers Union automobile insurance policyholders. The newly elected state president had promised to develop this potential membership pool, and so the executive committee believed that the "activities and energies" of the Oregon affiliate could be "properly marshalled and guided.""' Finally, the executive committee recommended that the Michigan Farmers Union be allowed to retain its charter, although its reasons for making this recommendation were unclear. The committee report vaguely referred to "existing obstacles" that had been surmounted, the recent improvement in the "public atfitude toward [the] Farmers Union," and "several organizafional changes" that had "already borne considerable fruit." The report concluded that there were "few, if any [negafive factors] with respect to our future in this state."*T he executive committee was not so optimistic about the Eastern Division. Dredging up a new rationale for charter revocafion, the report described "a material dissimilarity" in the populations of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the two states constitufing the Eastern Division. The executive committee argued that it might have been a mistake to have ever combined the two into one unit. Since "conscientious officers have failed to achieve a coordinated effort" between the two states, and since farmers in Fennsylvania had declined "for reasons of their own ... to join or parficipate as long as the present charter situafion prevails," the executive committee report suggested revoking the charter of the Eastem Division and then pursuing an "independent charter status" for Fennsylvania. The report warned that "further study and discussion" would be necessary before opening an aggressive membership cam-paign in New Jersey.^ The committee's recommendation deliberately avoided any mention of foreign policy disputes between the state and national leaderships. It also failed to mention that Alvin Christman and Louis Slocum, the two vocal critics of U.S. foreign policy who headed the Eastem Division, managed the affiliate from their offices in New Jersey.
The executive committee recommended revoking Iowa's charter as well. It praised the strength of the affiliate in the early history of the NFU, but noted that farmers in Iowa, "for whatever reasons they may have . . . will not join [the] Farmers Union in that state as it is presently constituted." The "continuing deterioration in the effectiveness" of the state organization Stood in stark contrast to the "abxmdant evidence that a new and fresh organizational start in Iowa would receive wide and effective farmer support."*^ Again, the recommendation never referred to foreign policy differences, presenting the case for charter revocation instead as a remedy to organizational ineffectiveness.
Not surprisingly, the national board of directors adopted the recommendations of the executive committee and revoked the charters of Iowa and the Eastem Division on March 13. Three days before the final decision was made, Fred Stover was summoned to Chicago to meet with NFU representatives Gus Geisler and Charles Brarman. The purpose of the meeting. Stover later reported, was to give the Iowa leader a last chance to save the state's charter. If he agreed to step down as president and allow the NFU to handpick a new leader "who never had any cormections or associations with the Iowa Farmers Union," Geisler and Brannan argued that Stover could save embarrassment for himself personally, for his state membership, and for the NFU as a whole.** Stover declined their offer and instead issued a "fact sheet" summarizing the events leading up to charter revocation. Stover, 44. Ibid., 2-3. 45. Ibid., 3. 46. "Fact Sheet: Statement by the Iowa Farmers Union," Stover Papers. Gus Geisler was an organizer for the National Farmers Union. Charles Brannan had been President Truman's Secretary of Agriculture, but became an NFU adviser thereafter. along with Alvin Christman, also published a statement describing the NEU action as "a shortsighted decision" that would "comfort orüy our enemies." Unlike the national leadership, who remained purposely vague about the decision. Stover, Christman, and Iowa member Lee Harthan developed thorough summaries that questioned the wisdom of reducing the organization's membership at a time when "join[ing] together for mutual protection" seemed to be the more logical goal. Harthan urged Patton to seize the opporturüty "to heal all the sores that exist in the Union."*'
The time for healing, however, had passed, at least in the mind of Jim Patton. As the Korean War ended, the NEU president covüd take comfort that his purge had at last succeeded. Unfortvmately, however, this purge did little to diminish the public's negative impressions of the National Earmers Union. Despite the NEU's support for U.S. policy in Korea, New Hampshire Senator Styles Bridges assailed the organization on the floor of the U.S. Senate. In a two-hour address. Bridges described the Commurüsts' "considerable, if not complete, success" in infiltrating the NEU. The NEU was also the subject of antiCommurüst attacks orchestrated by the Utah division of the American Earm Bureau. In a pamphlet titled How You Can Fight Communism, a Texas American Legion post charged Communist subversion within the NEU. In 1951 the House Un-American Activities Committee initiated investigations of the NEU during hearings on "communist activities among farm groups." The public's unchanged perception is reflected in the astonished statement of a Permsylvarüa woman who learned that the courts had ruled in favor of the National Earmers Urüon in a 1953 libel case. "What was wrong with the courts?" she wanted to know. "Was it not well established that the Earmers Urüon was Communist-infütrated?"** BETWEEN THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR and his death in 1985, Jim Patton rarely spoke about the purge. When he did, he insisted that the NFU's actions against Stover and the Iowa Farmers Union had nothing to do with differences of opinion over Korea in particular or over American foreign policy in general. Instead, Patton claimed, the fight against Stover and the Iowa Farmers Union had been necessary because of the Iowa leader's inability to build membership in his state. He characterized Stover not as a subversive, nor as a Communist, but as a "total non-conformist" who was "so cantankerous" and "so goddamn crazy" that he had to be removed for the sake of organizational unity.*' Although National Farmers Union officials still defend this argument, the facts tell another story. Fred Stover was not removed from the National Farmers Union for membership deficiencies, nor for organizafional ineffectiveness. He and the other members of the Iowa Farmers Union were purged because they challenged President Truman's foreign policy. Rumors that their challenge was Commimist-inspired represented a threat to the continued existence and effectiveness of the National Farmers Union, an organization that Jim Patton sought to preserve at all cost. In the dark days of the early Cold War, maintaining principles opposed to mainstream thought was a dangerous proposition. Fred Stover and the Iowa Farmers Union stood firm against containment and, in so doing, paid the price of dissent in an era of national hysteria.
